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T he interest in the possible advantages ofusing economic instruments to improvethe effectiveness and efficiency of environ-
mental policy is growing, both in the European
Union and in the Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs). The need for structural
reforms seems to create a unique opportunity to
incorporate ‘ecological’ elements into their fiscal
systems. Given this Europe-wide interest in apply-
ing economic instruments, as well as the interest
of some CEECs in adapting their environmental
policy to that of the EU, it seems obvious to look
for possibilities of a harmonized introduction of
environmental taxes throughout Europe.IRONMENT
F. OOSTERHUIS ET AL.One possible application area for a common
economic instrument might be the use of solvents,
which cause emissions of volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs). VOCs, together with NOx, are
chemical precursors to ozone. Policies that aim at
controlling ozone air quality (e.g. the EU’s acidi-
fication strategy) include measures to reduce
VOC emissions. A possible tax on solvents to
reduce VOC emissions has been studied for the
European Commission (Olsthoorn et al., 1996).
There are several complicating issues which need
to be addressed before such an instrument
could be applied in practice. Some of them
relate to the particular circumstances prevailing
in the CEECs and the specific role which environ-
mental taxes play in these countries. Other issues
are related to the nature of the VOC problem,
which poses a complex environmental policy
problem.
The aim of this article is to assess the feasibility
of introducing harmonized environmental taxes
in Europe, based on the example of a tax on
solvents, in both the EU and CEECs. The first
section discusses the particular role which econ-
omic instruments play in CEECs, and the special
circumstances prevailing in these countries which
should be taken into account when introducing
new economic instruments. The second section
gives a brief summary of the solvent – VOC
policy issues and the possible role of economic
instruments. The third section sketches the main
features of a possible solvent tax, whereas in the
fourth section the effectiveness and economic
impacts are considered, with special attention for
three industries (paint, printing and pharmaceu-
tics). The final section presents conclusions and
assesses the chances for implementation of a
solvent tax in Europe.ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Institutional and legal ‘harmonization’ (uniformi-
zation) in the countries of the former Soviet block
was prevailing in the field of environmental
regulation. Basic government authorities as en-
vironment ministries and inspectorates were set
up during the 1960s and 1970s, and basic
environmental legislation was carried out across
the countries of the region we now call Central
and Eastern Europe. Following the prevailing
Western trends, command-and-control type regu-
latory regimes were established with the key? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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corresponding non-compliance fines. Neverthe-
less, the machinery of environmental regulation,
while looking similar, served somewhat different
goals and functioned in a somewhat different
way from its Western prototype. One of the
major differences is correctly described by
Klarer (1994):
The concept of the rule of law as a social
norm is not as firmly established in the society
as it is in most Western democracies. To some
extent there remains from the previous politi-
cal system a rather casual regard of law as
something which should look good on paper
[catch up with the West] but not necessarily
firmly anchored in practice (p 24).
Behavioral rules, norms and possibilities were
mostly formed in informal ways and had little to
do with legal norms. To learn how to create and
enforce legislation that also pays attention to the
interests of the regulated is a task still to be
learned in many of the countries in the region.
The construction of the Eastern regulatory system
was also cheaper – the installation of some
‘luxury’ items, such as expensive monitoring
instruments or environmental data gathering,
were often omitted. All the above mentioned
factors add up to the often reported enforcement
problems in the CEECs.
In the period of liberalization of their econ-
omies, the CEE countries face the problem of how
to address their environmental problems. Tra-
ditionally, the advice from the side of economists
for these countries is to use economic incentives
(EIs) more extensively (see, for example, Barde,
1994; Environmental Action Programme for
CEE, 1993; Toman, 1994), thus substituting for
the prevailing command-and-control approach
and encouraging cost-effective environmental
policy-making.
Indeed, we can find a variety of cases where
new economic instruments have been introduced
in the CEECs. Russia introduced an extensive
pollution fee system in 1991 (Golub and
Strukova, 1994). Similar systems have been
adopted in Estonia (Klarer, 1994) and Lithuania
(Semeniene et al., 1996). While Poland had a
system of standards and emission charges for
many years prior to 1989, the role of economic
instruments, especially that of emission fees, has
become more important since 1990. The excep-
tionally high level of emission fees on SO2, NOx
and particulate matter emissions, and the activityEur. Env. 8, 129–136 (1998)
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mostly from these revenues, reflect this kind of
development (Toman et al., 1994; Francis, 1994;
Zylicz and Spyrka, 1994). Existing environmental
regulation in Hungary does not apply emission
charges at present, although a proposal to intro-
duce them for major air and water pollutants has
been prepared recently. The use of various prod-
uct charges is unique to this country (Lehoczki
and Morris, 1995). A recent piece of legislation
also created a system of emission fees in the
Czech Republic (Sejak, 1995).
Evidence on the practical experiences with the
application of economic instruments in CEECs is
still scarce. The different context of their applica-
tions also makes it difficult to draw generalized
statements about the experiences with economic
incentives in the region. However, some cautious
observations might help in defining conditions
that might significantly affect the operation of
economic instruments (EIs) in CEECs.
First, the so-called transformational recession
hit, in a severe way, all the CEECs in the period
1989–1992.* Creeping inflation in some countries
poses another problem with regard to the appli-
cation of some EIs (especially charges, fines and
taxes) in the region. Since such charges take
mostly the form of unit taxes/charges defined on
the base of units of pollutants/products, it is hard
to preserve the real value of these charges in
times of high inflation. Clearly, quantity-based
regulations (e.g. permit markets) or ad valorem
charges/taxes could more easily circumvent these
problems.
Second, private ownership of enterprises, with
a simultaneous elimination of widespread subsid-
ization, is a necessary precondition for the mean-
ingful implementation of EIs. However, the speed
and method of privatization differ to a great
extent in the region. While, as a consequence of
massive privatization of state-owned enterprises,
the preconditions for the application of market-
based regulations have improved substantially in
CEE countries such as Poland or Hungary during
1990–97, some other countries followed a much
more cautious privatization policy (Brada, 1996).
One should not expect the potential incentive
effect of the EIs to work when they are applied in
economies where the survival of enterprises does
not depend crucially on their profitability.
Third, we would argue that, in the CEECs,
environmental tax proposals should be put for-
*Concerning the analytics of output decline in CEECs see
Holzmann et al. (1995).? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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the public administration and efficient spending
issues than has been typical to date.† When
looking at the institutional conditions that char-
acterize environmental administration in the
CEECs, one might doubt that public spending is
typically efficient even in a weak sense, namely,
that it finances projects with positive economic
(including environmental) benefits. Cost effective-
ness and cost-benefit analyses are not included in
the process of public project appraisals in these
countries. Wasteful spending can, through creat-
ing unnecessary distortions, induce significant
additional welfare costs for these societies,
thus making environmental tax proposals less
appealing than they might appear at first sight.
Finally, there are some serious pre-existing
distortions with respect to the operation of
environmental taxes in the CEECs. The basic
argument in favour of environmental taxes is
based on partial equilibrium analysis (see Baumol
and Oates, 1988, pp 211–234). According to the
traditional view, such taxes are the rare ones that
do not impose efficiency losses on the economy.
Moreover, the so-called ‘double dividend’ argu-
ment claims that beyond the welfare gains caused
by the correction of a negative externality, the
revenue raised by environmental taxes could be
used for lowering the level of already existing
distortionary taxes in the economy (preferably
on labour). Some recent articles (Parry, 1995;
Goulder, 1995) point out that in a ‘more general’
equilibrium analysis, the imposition of the
environmental tax will worsen pre-existing mar-
ket distortions. This in turn will add a welfare loss
to the welfare gains emphasized by the double
dividend argument. This might turn out to be
especially important in the CEE context, since
central redistribution of incomes was historically
high in these countries.EUROPEAN POLICIES ON VOCS AND
SOLVENTS AND THE ROLE OF
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
According to the Stockholm Declaration on the
Environment (1972) the states are responsible for
not polluting the environment of other states.
On the basis of this principle in 1979 the
European countries, USA and Canada accepted
†The typical institutions for environmental fund redistribution in
the CEE region are Environmental Funds. For more information on
the operations of these institutions see Lehoczki and Peszko
(1994).Eur. Env. 8, 129–136 (1998)
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Transboundary Air Pollution, within which sev-
eral protocols were signed. In 1991 the UN – ECE
protocol for the control of VOC emissions was
signed, where participating countries (including
the EU) agreed to reduce emissions by 30% by
the year 1999, with 1988 levels usually as the
baseline.
Emissions of VOCs contribute to the creation
of ground ozone, which can damage the health of
people and ecosystems. VOC emissions are a
priority issue for European Commission’s environ-
mental policy. In the EC’s Fifth Environmental
Action Programme, the emission reduction tar-
gets for VOCs are 10% in 1996 and 30% in
2000, with respect to the 1990 levels (European
Commission, 1992).
Some countries have set more stringent targets.
For instance, Austria has established a reduction
target of 70% by 2006 and Sweden aims at a 50%
reduction by 2000, both based on 1988 levels. A
number of countries have set reduction targets for
individual sectors of industry. The Dutch KWS
2000 control strategy, which aims at a reduction
of 63% in VOC emissions over the period 1981–
2000, has provided a model which has subse-
quently been adopted by other countries such
as Denmark and Hungary. The Dutch system
specifies general measures to be taken to reduce
emissions, but allowing much flexibility. In
Denmark, government and industry have agreed
on a 50% reduction of VOC emissions by the
year 2000, with reduction targets varying by
industry.
Solvent use in Europe accounts for about 50%
of total (non-methane) VOC emissions from
stationary sources. The EC has drafted a proposal
for a directive on the limitation of emissions of
organic compounds due to the use of organic
solvents in certain processes and industrial instal-
lations. It requires the application of the best
available technologies (BATs) and the preparation
of ‘solvent management plans’ for several activi-
ties such as printing, surface and dry cleaning and
coating processes. Sources such as small scale
trade and industry, artisans and private house-
holds, are not covered by the directive. For these
target groups a product-oriented approach, based
on ecolabels, product standards or product
charges or taxes, for instance, seems more suitable
(Olsthoorn et al., 1996).
The different European countries have indi-
vidually adopted many different policy instru-
ments for the control of VOC emissions, based
mainly on command-and-control approaches such? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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bans, product standards and imposition of abate-
ment measures. Voluntary and information instru-
ments such as voluntary agreements and ecolabels
are also used.
The use of economic instruments for the con-
trol of VOC emissions is still mostly in a study
stage. France, Poland and the Czech and Slovak
Republics have already included VOC emissions
in the list of atmospheric pollutants to which
emission charges are applied. Besides, the Czech
Republic stimulates the usage of water-based
paints, applying to them the lower rate of VAT
(5% instead of the general rate of 22%). Austria,
The Netherlands and Switzerland have developed
studies on the application of VOC charges and
taxes, but they have not yet been implemented.*
The application of other types of economic instru-
ment such as tradable permits and ‘solvent renting
systems’ has also been discussed in Germany.A PRODUCT TAX ON SOLVENTS
The large variety in solvent applications and
associated costs of substitution and VOC emis-
sion abatement makes the use of economic instru-
ments particularly attractive for the control of
VOC emissions from solvents. An outright ban
on the production and use of solvent – VOCs is
neither necessary nor feasible; limiting their appli-
cation areas to the ‘essential’ ones would involve
substantial bureaucratic effort and opportunities
for fraud, and evidence in several countries shows
also that the reductions of VOC emissions which
can be achieved by means of voluntary measures
are insufficient.
It seems clear that the most suitable economic
instrument is a tax (fee, charge), given the import-
ant role of economic instruments in CEECs in
raising revenue, particularly for the ‘environ-
mental funds’. Given the ‘non-point’ character of a
large part of solvent – VOC emissions, it is obvi-
ous that an emission tax is not feasible. Monitor-
ing emissions from all solvent users would be
prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the tax should
be levied as a product tax on the solvents
themselves or on products containing solvents.
The harmonized introduction of an environmental
charge could prevent the undue deterioration of
competitiveness of the regulated industries in
those countries applying the charge. Also, a co-
ordinated measure would prevent the incidence of
*The Swiss proposal for a tax on VOCs has been approved by
parliament, but the actual status of implementation is unclear.Eur. Env. 8, 129–136 (1998)
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ences in regulatory strictness among European
nations.
The proposed product tax could be uniform for
all solvents, or differentiated according to the
solvent category. A uniform tax is administra-
tively simple, although it does not take the
specific environmental properties of each sub-
stance into account. Certainly, the implementation
of a uniform tax would put highly diverse policy-
related costs on different countries, thus leaving
much space for bargaining about cost sharing and
room for strategic behaviour from the side of the
affected country.
Another possible differentiation would be a
geographical and temporal one. Although this
would do justice to the possible differences in
environmental impact, such a differentiation will
not be feasible, because one cannot predict where
and when a certain amount of solvent, which is
subject to the tax, will lead to VOC emissions.
Even a differentiation between member states of
the EU would probably turn out not to be work-
able, because it could easily be frustrated by cross-
border shipments. For the EU, a practical solution
could be a harmonized minimum tax level, com-
parable with the present system of excise taxes.
The needed level of the tax rate will be
determined by the emission reduction target and
the price elasticity of the demand for solvents.
Unfortunately, little is known about the abate-
ment cost function for VOC emissions from
solvents, which depend very much on specific
circumstances, such as the type of solvent-using
activity, the scale of the process and the skills of
the people working with the solvents. Estimates
of abatement costs for various applications range
between 0 and 10 ECU per kilogram VOC
reduced (OECD, 1990; Zierock, 1991). However,
the amounts of VOCs which can be reduced
against a given cost per kilogram are largely
unknown, implying that the ‘correct’ level of the
tax will therefore have to be found by means of
‘trial and error’. Previous studies (Bruhin et al.,
1989; LMO, 1990; USEPA, 1991; Swedish
Environmental Charge Commission, 1990) sug-
gest a tax rate somewhere between 0.5 and 3
ECU per kg for ‘ordinary’ VOCs, and between 1
and 6 ECU per kg for chlorinated (and carcino-
genic) VOCs, allowing emission reductions in the
order of magnitude of 30 to 60%. Instead of using
a nominal rate, an ad valorem tax (of the order of
magnitude of 100%) could be imposed. The tax
could be phased in gradually, starting at a low
rate and increasing to its final level over a period? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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tiveness of the solvent tax will be enhanced if it is
related as closely as possible to the amount of
VOCs actually emitted, and, therefore, it would
be preferable to levy the tax from the final user of
the (product containing) solvent. However, the
number of solvent users is too large to make this
a feasible option.
An alternative is to levy the tax at the moment
when the (products containing) solvents are being
sold by the producers or importers. This alterna-
tive has the advantage that the number of tax
payers is fairly small, thus restricting the admin-
istrative and enforcement costs. A disadvantage
of this system would be its lack of compliance
with the ‘destination principle’ and the fact that
the tax burden is also put on solvents which will
not lead to VOC emissions (for instance, because
they are being used as a feedstock or as a fuel).
The solvent tax rules should allow for some
exemptions, namely for exports of (products con-
taining) solvents (since the tax is applied to attain
local objectives and domestic producers should
not be put in a disadvantageous competitive
position with regard to foreign producers), for
non-solvent uses of the substances and for
recycled solvents (to stimulate recycling).
No exemptions should be made for those
(applications of) solvents for which no reasonable
alternatives are presently available. This would
also take away the incentive to search for alter-
natives, and be administratively complex and
susceptible to fraud. One of the big advantages of
a tax over a ban is the fact that the market will
determine where solvents are really indispensable.
A tax refund can be considered for cases where
the user can demonstrate that effective measures
have been taken to prevent the solvent from
leading to air emissions. In the case of recycling or
reprocessing, a tax refund should not be given,
because the proposed system already envisages a
tax exemption for recycled solvents. As long as
the solvent has not been destroyed, it has the
potential to produce VOC emissions and should
therefore bear the tax.
Whereas the presently existing environmental
levies have generally been introduced to finance
specific purposes (such as the Environmental
Funds in CEECs), the proposed tax on solvents is
meant to be a ‘pure’ incentive tax and its revenues
can be seen as a side-effect. Therefore, there is no
reason a priori to allocate this money to environ-
mental funds. Earmarking for environmental pur-
poses could nevertheless lead to greater political
and public support for the tax and contribute toEur. Env. 8, 129–136 (1998)
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and lower (cumulative) costs for firms, if revenues
are used to finance solvent reduction options
(R&D projects, subsidies for investment in abate-
ment techniques or low-solvent alternatives). In
the CEECs, a strong case could be made for
leaving at least part of the tax revenues with the
taxpaying firms (on the condition that they invest
in pollution abatement measures).
In the proposed tax system, all solvents and
products containing solvents are treated in an
equal manner, irrespective of their origin
(imported or produced domestically) and there-
fore the tax will not come into conflict with the
relevant GATT/WTO rules. The taxation of
imported products will imply that their solvent
content should be indicated on the product itself,
or in an accompanying document, but this
requirement must not be regarded as a technical
barrier to trade, since it seems clear that it has no
protectionist intention at all, and therefore does
not offend against the GATT Standards Code.
On the other hand, the solvent tax could create
an incentive for some firms to transfer their
solvent-based activities (e.g., metal degreasing) to
countries where such a tax is not applied. This is
one of the reasons for international harmonization
of the tax.
Table 1. GDP in selected countries (1990, 1991
tax revenue
Country GDP
(bln USD)
Solvent emissi
in tonnes 1990
Czech Rep. 25.3 93 023
Slovakia 10.2 55 112
Poland 75.3 230 080
Latvia 4.9 1 310
Lithuania 5.1 11 205
Estonia 4.3 6 681
Germany* 1789.3 1 030 210
France 1278.7 635 629
Netherlands 312.3 145 249
*Only former Western Germany.
Source: World Bank, OECD, Eurostat, CORINAECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SOLVENT
TAX
Assuming a (uniform) tax rate of 1 ECU per kg on
all solvents, introduced at once, the initial (poten-? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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amount of solvents in kilograms sold in each
country. If we assume that the tax is reimbursed
for implemented emission reductions, and if we
leave aside international trade, the potential rev-
enues (in ECUs) are equal to the VOC emissions
(in kilograms) from solvents per country. Table 1
gives an idea of the possible revenues in relation
to their GDP for nine selected countries. We can
see that in the CEECs the impact of a 1 ECU tax
on solvents (as a percentage of GDP) is several
times higher than in Western European countries.
A lower tax rate in CEECs, or an ad valorem tax,
would lead to smaller differences in tax revenue
relative to GDP.
Given the large variety in applications, abate-
ment and substitution options and cost structures,
a full assessment of the economic consequences of
a VOC tax for all sectors is obviously not feasible
in the scope of this article. We will therefore focus
on the results for three industries (paint, printing
and pharmaceutics).
In the paint industry, whose products are a
major source of VOC emissions, even a relatively
low tax rate could have a strong impact in
terms of substitution by low-solvent alternatives.
Nevertheless, the application of a uniform solvent
tax, in ECU, will imply different impacts in the
domestic markets, due to the following factors:
the average price per kilogram of solvent (in
ECUs) has significant differences: in CEECs it is
only around 50% of the value for EU countries
(this point is related to the disparities between
currencies, exchange rates and the parity of
omparison with solvent emissions and possible
Revenue in
mln ECU
Revenue in
% of GDP
mln USD
93 120 0.47
55 71 0.69
230 297 0.39
1 1.3 0.03
11 14 0.23
7 7.7 0.18
1030 1329 0.07
635 819 0.06
145 187 0.05purchase power); the solvent intensity in paint
Eur. Env. 8, 129–136 (1998)
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CEECs and EU countries.
The available technologies to reduce VOC
emissions in the printing industry differ according
to the printing technique, and, therefore, the costs
of emission abatement and of low-solvent substi-
tutes differ widely. Solvent consumption includes
not only the ‘direct’ incorporation of solvents in
the process (e.g. as an additive) and in the
cleaning operations, but also the ‘indirect’ incor-
poration through the consumption of inks. The
share of solvents in the production costs will
usually not exceed 1%.
In many cases, the barriers for VOC reduction
are probably technical rather than financial. Even
with a tax of 1 ECU per kg the share of solvent
costs in total production costs would not change
dramatically. The only exception is rotogravure
printing, but there the recycling of toluene is
often already profitable at present prices. How-
ever, given the fact that the costs of some
abatement and substitution options are lower than
1 ECU per kilogram VOC abated, the tax is
likely to have at least some impact on emission
reductions.
In the pharmaceutical industry, technological
substitution is not generally a feasible measure for
VOC emissions reduction. The main VOC control
measures taken by this industry are directed to
reduce the volume of unrecovered solvents and to
end-of-pipe measures. Abatement costs are usu-
ally higher than 1 ECU per kg, so a tax would
need to be very high to have an incentive effect.
The share of solvent costs in total production
costs for this industry is almost negligible.
It can be expected that a solvent tax of 1 ECU
per kg will not be a sufficient incentive for a
change in the behaviour of market agents due to
the restrictions to technological substitution and
the high costs of end-of-pipe VOC control
measures usually adopted in this sector, associated
with the low impact of the tax in production
costs. Command-and-control approaches, or a
mixed approach, seem to be more adequate to
control emissions in this industry.CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVE
Despite their theoretical advantages, economic
instruments are nowhere the core tool of environ-
mental policy. The policy objective of reducing
VOC emissions, shared by most European
countries, seems to offer an interesting oppor-
tunity for the introduction of a harmonized? 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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However, such an initiative should take into
account the differences between these countries
and the specific conditions prevailing in CEECs.
A tax on solvents is likely to contribute signifi-
cantly to VOC reduction, without major econ-
omic harm for the industries concerned. If the tax
is levied from producers and importers, and the
number of exemptions is limited, implementation
will be relatively straightforward. The institu-
tional requirements of such a tax will probably
not be more complicated than those of most
existing excise taxes or environmental policy
instruments.
A uniform solvent tax with a single rate (e.g.
1 ECU per kg) throughout Europe would be
neither optimal nor feasible. In the CEECs, the tax
should have a lower rate than in the EU, and the
revenues should at least partly be used to assist
firms in VOC reduction and solvent substitution.
A nationally differentiated approach seems to
be the most realistic prospect. Several countries
are already preparing concrete plans for putting
economic instruments at work to reduce VOC
emissions from solvents. The experiences from a
variety of national initiatives might in due course
lead other countries to follow suit and to some
form of (partial) ‘bottom up’ harmonization.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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